ckparrothead
Premium Member
In order to find out just how effective splitting carries can be, I believe you have to evaluate a NUMBER of different factors and categories. A ground attack should always be viewed on a broader basis than individual statistics. If one is measuring the worth of a certain runner’s presence in the backfield, one should not merely look at his own statistics, but those of others as well. A featured runner, for instance, can contribute to a 3rd down back’s effectiveness merely by being dominant during his own work, or he can contribute negatively by not being dominant.
This is especially true in the case of split carries between two running backs.
So here we are trying to evaluate what has happened to our backfield and offense since Ricky Williams came back. We had one way of doing things before Ricky was here, and now we have another way of doing things. Has anything changed?
A true measure of the experiment of having Ricky Williams split carries with Ronnie Brown is not Ricky Williams’ statistics, but an amalgamation of statistics. For instance, excluding Ronnie Brown’s 65 yard scamper, Ricky and Ronnie alone have contributed just 59 yards and a TD on 27 carries of rushing. But, why should we isolate out the 65 yard touchdown run? It was not during garbage time, nor was it some complete aberration, seeing as how Ronnie already had a 65 yard run against the Carolina Panthers. So, not excluding the run, the Dolphins have combined for 124 yards on 28 runs and 2 TDs. That certainly looks better.
But, why should we exclude wide receiver reverses from the statistics? The Buccaneers were clearly hurt by wide receiver reverses because of their over-aggressiveness toward Miami running backs. Derrick Brooks admitted as much after the game. If a running back duo’s prowess contributes to reverse yardage, surely that should also be counted into the picture. Counting reverses, the Dolphins have rushed for 149 yards and 2 TDs on 31 carries, which is a 4.8 yard per carry average.
For an even more complete view of the split backfield, we should also include passes caught out of the backfield, of which there are 8 catches for 81 yards. All in all, the duo is either directly gaining, or directly contributing to the gain of 230 yards and 2 TDs on 39 plays for an average of 5.9 yards per run play or caught pass.
Next we must consider under the same circumstances, how were the Dolphins faring prior to Ricky Williams arrival. The answer is they were just as effective in the ground game, and less effective through the air in running back catches. Reverses and running back handoffs accounted for 459 yards and 2 TDs on 94 carries over a four game period. The average, 4.9 yards per carry and 0.5 TDs per game, is hardly better than the 4.8 yards per carry and 1.0 TDs per game with Williams sharing the load. Meanwhile, Ronnie Brown, Sammy Morris, and Travis Minor combined for 18 catches and 87 yards, as compared to Ricky & Ronnie combining for 8 catches for 81 yards in the last two games.
So, given the argument that Ricky Williams has merely detracted from the Dolphins effectiveness out of the backfield, the stats show otherwise.
The Dolphins amassed 546 yards, 2 TDs, and 22 first downs on 112 plays in the four-game stretch prior to Williams’ arrival.
They have amassed 230 yards, 2 TDs, and 9 first downs on 39 plays during the two-game stretch since his arrival.
The Dolphins were averaging over 5 backfield plays per first down, and one touchdown every two games prior to Williams’ arrival, and are now averaging about 4 backfield plays per first down and one touchdown every game since Williams’ arrival.
The Dolphins averaged 4.9 yards per backfield play prior to Williams' arrival, and now average 5.9 yards per backfield play since his arrival.
The yardage case does not even appear to be different, even though it is quite obvious to all of us that the Dolphins need to be giving MORE carries to Ricky and Ronnie. The Dolphins' backfield accounted for about 137 yards per game prior to Ricky's arrival, and have accounted for 115 yards per game since his arrival.
On the contrary to the theories that Ricky is detracting from effectiveness, it is my beilef that the statistical signs are pointing to considerable upside potential if Ricky begins to gain more traction on the ground without losing effectiveness in the other areas.
My conclusion is that the Dolphins have not lost effectiveness out of the backfield due to Ricky's arrival, but have actually gained some effectiveness, and have the potential for considerable upside when and if Ricky is able to get "untracked a little bit" and the Dolphins begin to reward their running backs with more running plays to go along side the catches and WR reverses.
This is especially true in the case of split carries between two running backs.
So here we are trying to evaluate what has happened to our backfield and offense since Ricky Williams came back. We had one way of doing things before Ricky was here, and now we have another way of doing things. Has anything changed?
A true measure of the experiment of having Ricky Williams split carries with Ronnie Brown is not Ricky Williams’ statistics, but an amalgamation of statistics. For instance, excluding Ronnie Brown’s 65 yard scamper, Ricky and Ronnie alone have contributed just 59 yards and a TD on 27 carries of rushing. But, why should we isolate out the 65 yard touchdown run? It was not during garbage time, nor was it some complete aberration, seeing as how Ronnie already had a 65 yard run against the Carolina Panthers. So, not excluding the run, the Dolphins have combined for 124 yards on 28 runs and 2 TDs. That certainly looks better.
But, why should we exclude wide receiver reverses from the statistics? The Buccaneers were clearly hurt by wide receiver reverses because of their over-aggressiveness toward Miami running backs. Derrick Brooks admitted as much after the game. If a running back duo’s prowess contributes to reverse yardage, surely that should also be counted into the picture. Counting reverses, the Dolphins have rushed for 149 yards and 2 TDs on 31 carries, which is a 4.8 yard per carry average.
For an even more complete view of the split backfield, we should also include passes caught out of the backfield, of which there are 8 catches for 81 yards. All in all, the duo is either directly gaining, or directly contributing to the gain of 230 yards and 2 TDs on 39 plays for an average of 5.9 yards per run play or caught pass.
Next we must consider under the same circumstances, how were the Dolphins faring prior to Ricky Williams arrival. The answer is they were just as effective in the ground game, and less effective through the air in running back catches. Reverses and running back handoffs accounted for 459 yards and 2 TDs on 94 carries over a four game period. The average, 4.9 yards per carry and 0.5 TDs per game, is hardly better than the 4.8 yards per carry and 1.0 TDs per game with Williams sharing the load. Meanwhile, Ronnie Brown, Sammy Morris, and Travis Minor combined for 18 catches and 87 yards, as compared to Ricky & Ronnie combining for 8 catches for 81 yards in the last two games.
So, given the argument that Ricky Williams has merely detracted from the Dolphins effectiveness out of the backfield, the stats show otherwise.
The Dolphins amassed 546 yards, 2 TDs, and 22 first downs on 112 plays in the four-game stretch prior to Williams’ arrival.
They have amassed 230 yards, 2 TDs, and 9 first downs on 39 plays during the two-game stretch since his arrival.
The Dolphins were averaging over 5 backfield plays per first down, and one touchdown every two games prior to Williams’ arrival, and are now averaging about 4 backfield plays per first down and one touchdown every game since Williams’ arrival.
The Dolphins averaged 4.9 yards per backfield play prior to Williams' arrival, and now average 5.9 yards per backfield play since his arrival.
The yardage case does not even appear to be different, even though it is quite obvious to all of us that the Dolphins need to be giving MORE carries to Ricky and Ronnie. The Dolphins' backfield accounted for about 137 yards per game prior to Ricky's arrival, and have accounted for 115 yards per game since his arrival.
On the contrary to the theories that Ricky is detracting from effectiveness, it is my beilef that the statistical signs are pointing to considerable upside potential if Ricky begins to gain more traction on the ground without losing effectiveness in the other areas.
My conclusion is that the Dolphins have not lost effectiveness out of the backfield due to Ricky's arrival, but have actually gained some effectiveness, and have the potential for considerable upside when and if Ricky is able to get "untracked a little bit" and the Dolphins begin to reward their running backs with more running plays to go along side the catches and WR reverses.
