the logic of belichik's decision

[isaacjunk]

As an engineer-type, I thought Belichick's 4th down decision was kind of a toss-up...I simply didn't know when it happened how crazy it was. So I thought it might help to put some #'s behind it to see where they led---

Basically, call "x" the odds that you stop the Colts on a 65 yard drive with 2 mins remaining + 1 timeout, which is the likely outcome if you punt. And then, call "y" the odds that you stop the Colts on a 28 yard drive with the same time/timeouts, which is the likely outcome if you go for it and FAIL. The other major factor is, of course, the odds you will succeed in converting 4th and 2, so let's call that "z". For simplicity, let's assume if they get it, the game is over.

I'm estimating the odds of converting 4th and 2 in general are about 50%. The odds of converting 3rd and 2 historically are at 52% [ http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80ae2bf7&template=with-video&confirm=true ], so that gives you some idea.

So, for the Pats, the odds of winning if you go for it are:
.5 + .5 * y

The odds of winning of you punt are:
x

The side with the bigger total is the better decision.

Now, I don't know the real #'s for this, but let's say that the pats stop manning 1/4 the time on a 28-yd short field. If so, that means the pats would have to stop manning on a 65-yard field .5 + .5 * .25 = .625, or 63% of the time, in order for "punt" to be the right decision. Do you really believe that the Pats would stop Peyton Manning over 6/10 times, from Manning's own 35, 2 minutes, and 1 timeout remaining, having just given up 2 quick TD scoring drives in a row?

One other factor is that, if you go for it and fail, the odds of the colts scoring more quickly, and giving you time to drive into FG range to retake the lead, are probably higher. Didn't work out that way, but it almost happened ( shoestring tackle at the 2 ended up chewing off lots more time ). This isn't a huge possibility, but I think more significant than the other very improbable factors ( like fumbles, etc. )--probably worth a few more percentage points.

The point is, the decision, while highly unorthodox, isn't completely crazy and comes down to what you believe the odds are. The way the pats were moving, maybe Belichick thought the odds of getting the first down were > 50%. I'm not saying that going for it was clearly the right decision---from my estimates, I personally believe it may be slightly more advantageous than punting, but I cannot say with any real certainty. But what is clear is that the decision is not so plainly bone-headed as it may first seem...so props to the coach for being aggressive on a toss-up decision.

 

[Sirspud]

It was crazy, but I have to admit that he really freaked me out when he did it and I honestly thought the Pats were going to win on that play. Its going to be discussed as a horrible call all season but I actually felt like it had a very high percentage of working, and only mere inches and perhaps a bad, unchallengable call kept it from working.

But the reason why it may have been more of a gamble than it was worth was that it failing simply gave the Colts the absolute perfect situation to use their all-time great offense to win the game. And I do think that their chances of scoring from the 30 were extremely high, but losing 40 yards of field position would have shifted those odds dramatically. I'd still say that Manning would be likely to score, but given the way that they had turned the ball over uncharacteristically several times, its far from unfathomable that they would repeat that trying to drive downfield hurriedly.

All in all, I think that the Patriots lost this game because they failed to execute when just one more score or even one more first down would have won it. The Bellichek gamble not working practically sealed the deal, but it was just the final straw in what was the failure of a team to seal a game well in hand when offensive execution simply would have done it. In that situation, the other team's offense is irrelevant.

 

[Rev Kev]

You live and die by the sword... their confidence is hardly broken

 

[Eshlemon]

As an engineer-type, I thought Belichick's 4th down decision was kind of a toss-up...I simply didn't know when it happened how crazy it was. So I thought it might help to put some #'s behind it to see where they led---

Basically, call "x" the odds that you stop the Colts on a 65 yard drive with 2 mins remaining + 1 timeout, which is the likely outcome if you punt. And then, call "y" the odds that you stop the Colts on a 28 yard drive with the same time/timeouts, which is the likely outcome if you go for it and FAIL. The other major factor is, of course, the odds you will succeed in converting 4th and 2, so let's call that "z". For simplicity, let's assume if they get it, the game is over.

I'm estimating the odds of converting 4th and 2 in general are about 50%. The odds of converting 3rd and 2 historically are at 52% [ http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80ae2bf7&template=with-video&confirm=true ], so that gives you some idea.

So, for the Pats, the odds of winning if you go for it are:
.5 + .5 * y

The odds of winning of you punt are:
x

The side with the bigger total is the better decision.

Now, I don't know the real #'s for this, but let's say that the pats stop manning 1/4 the time on a 28-yd short field. If so, that means the pats would have to stop manning on a 65-yard field .5 + .5 * .25 = .625, or 63% of the time, in order for "punt" to be the right decision. Do you really believe that the Pats would stop Peyton Manning over 6/10 times, from Manning's own 35, 2 minutes, and 1 timeout remaining, having just given up 2 quick TD scoring drives in a row?

One other factor is that, if you go for it and fail, the odds of the colts scoring more quickly, and giving you time to drive into FG range to retake the lead, are probably higher. Didn't work out that way, but it almost happened ( shoestring tackle at the 2 ended up chewing off lots more time ). This isn't a huge possibility, but I think more significant than the other very improbable factors ( like fumbles, etc. )--probably worth a few more percentage points.

The point is, the decision, while highly unorthodox, isn't completely crazy and comes down to what you believe the odds are. The way the pats were moving, maybe Belichick thought the odds of getting the first down were > 50%. I'm not saying that going for it was clearly the right decision---from my estimates, I personally believe it may be slightly more advantageous than punting, but I cannot say with any real certainty. But what is clear is that the decision is not so plainly bone-headed as it may first seem...so props to the coach for being aggressive on a toss-up decision.

If the bold above is why you go for it, why defend a Colts on the short field at all. Let the Colts score quickly and put your offense back on the field with as much time as possible to get within field goal range.

If the defense complains...well we didn't trust you to hold Peyton from scoring from 70 yards and know you can't hold Peyton from 30.

 

[Tailgater]

If the bold above is why you go for it, why defend a Colts on the short field at all. Let the Colts score quickly and put your offense back on the field with as much time as possible to get within field goal range.

If the defense complains...well we didn't trust you to hold Peyton from scoring from 70 yards and know you can't hold Peyton from 30.

That might have worked, or maybe Caldwell and Peyton had watched the Jets game and done the same thing MJD did.

 

[HeartbreakKid28]

Why are so many people scared to call out Belicheat??? If any other coach does that they would be calling to fire him. If any other team was involved in spygate, there would have been some Salem witch trial type $hit

 

[Eshlemon]

That might have worked, or maybe Caldwell and Peyton had watched the Jets game and done the same thing MJD did.

But Jacksonville only needed a FG to win and not a TD...now that would have been a "gutsy" move trumping Belicheks.

 

[tcolli17]

This is all they have been talking about all day today, and I can't get enough of it.

 

[Awsi Dooger]

I'm estimating the odds of converting 4th and 2 in general are about 50%. The odds of converting 3rd and 2 historically are at 52% [ http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80ae2bf7&template=with-video&confirm=true ], so that gives you some idea.

I think you're far too low on the estimated probability of Brady converting the first down. In fact, IMO the argument has been distorted everywhere by over reacting to the result, and therefore assigning a lesser than actual likelihood of making the first down.

New England was a considerable favorite to make the two yards. My immediate estimate, posted here and elsewhere, was 1/3 favorite, which means -300 or 3 chances in 4, 75%. In retrospect that might be high but I don't think it's grossly high. ESPN looked it up today and the Patriots have converted 4th and 2 or less 68 of 89 times since Brady's first year as starter in 2001, 76.4%.

Okay, so it's not a perfect comparison since it's 4th and 2, not 4th and 1, and you're on the road, not home, and the Colts are superior to most of the opponents among that sample of 89. Still, I think it's significantly closer to 70 or 75% than the 50-60 that I've seen estimated today. For one thing, Brady did not have the lethal and clutch combo of Moss and Welker for the vast majority of that sample of 89. They joined the Patriots in 2007.

It was a very smart strategic move in which the result detoured to the low end of probability. Happens all the time. I read today that Archie Manning was petrified that Belichick would go for it. He understood the benefit, even if the media doesn't. For one thing, the claims that New England was stopping Manning for the bulk of the game are meaningless. They were stopping three downs, not four. That's another area when math intervenes. Late game comebacks are enabled to huge extent by the tradeoff that the trailing team can utilize all four downs while the team protecting the lead is stuck with the traditional three. Marino, Elway, Favre and everyone else would have decidedly fewer 4th quarter comebacks if they were relying on three downs and not four in the closing minutes. Belichick decided to cheat and use all four downs. He was burned, but it was an astute choice. At worst, he stole several percentage points on the probability scale.

 

[TB12]

This is all they have been talking about all day today, and I can't get enough of it.

Sad that's all you have to look forward to in regards to the Pats. Good call, bad play and Brady picked the wrong WR. BB is still the best coach in the league bar none.

 

[greasyObnoxious]

That might have worked, or maybe Caldwell and Peyton had watched the Jets game and done the same thing MJD did.

yeah, imagine that ending. the Pats fail to convert a 4th down inside their own 30. the Colts drive down to the 1, milk the clock and fail to score a TD.

in all honesty, i would have gone for the 1st down, too. their O had been able to move the ball all game. on the flipside, the D struggled against the Colts' O in the 4th quarter.