This stat in the first section alone was enough gold but the rest of the article has other nice concepts.
The value of trading down -- and not trading up -- has been an enduring refrain of analytics disciples ever since economists Cade Massey and Richard Thaler wrote their original paper on overconfidence and market efficiency (or lack thereof) in the NFL draft more than 15 years ago. In that analysis the economists found, for example, that the probability a first-round player starts more games than the next-selected player at his position is just 58% -- and only 53% across the entire draft. Still, even as other quantitative analysis conclusions have achieved major NFL buy-in -- from fourth-down attempts to pass-first philosophies to the value of running backs -- GMs continue to pay expensive prices to land specific prospects they covet in the draft.
The value of trading down -- and not trading up -- has been an enduring refrain of analytics disciples ever since economists Cade Massey and Richard Thaler wrote their original paper on overconfidence and market efficiency (or lack thereof) in the NFL draft more than 15 years ago. In that analysis the economists found, for example, that the probability a first-round player starts more games than the next-selected player at his position is just 58% -- and only 53% across the entire draft. Still, even as other quantitative analysis conclusions have achieved major NFL buy-in -- from fourth-down attempts to pass-first philosophies to the value of running backs -- GMs continue to pay expensive prices to land specific prospects they covet in the draft.
GMs love to trade up in the NFL draft, but it's often a mistake: Why their reasoning doesn't match reality
NFL general managers often pat themselves on the back for draft trade-ups, and they use similar quotes to do it. But they're usually wrong.
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